Over 60% of 167 exits were direct deals with no broker
Tallying the deal routes of 167 listed exits: over 60% were direct deals with no broker. Platform deals: Batonz 27, TRANBI 9, Rakko M&A 8. Buyers and pricing differ by route.
By the Small Start editorial desk. We count every case in the archive by hand. The figures belong to the sources. The judgments are ours.
For a seller, the first practical question is “where should I list it to sell?” This tally is based on the 337 cases listed on this site as of August 12, 2026 (168 exited, 165 operating). Classifying the exited cases by deal route yields the following.
Breakdown of Deal Routes
| Route | Count |
|---|---|
| Direct (no broker or platform) | 104 |
| Batonz (Japanese small M&A) | 27 |
| Other brokers/intermediaries | 14 |
| TRANBI (Japanese business succession) | 9 |
| Rakko M&A (Japanese site sales) | 8 |
| Overseas platforms such as Acquire.com | 5 |
The largest share is direct deals, at over 60% of the total. This doesn’t mean platforms are unnecessary, though. Looking at the breakdown, most direct deals are overseas SaaS and media cases where the buyer is an industry roll-up company or an operating business. It’s simply that in industries where prospective buyers are visible from the start, there’s no need to go through an intermediary.
What Buyers Look At Differs By Route
Buyers in direct deals are operating businesses or roll-ups. What they look at is fit with their own customer base, and price is decided by “will this grow if we plug it into what we have.” Among the cases listed, there is one where acquisition talks began after a demo at a conference and the deal closed at twice the initial offer. Showing up with a working product where buyers are actively looking is the best sales pitch there is.
On Japanese platforms (Batonz, TRANBI, Rakko M&A), buyers are often individuals or small operators. What they look at is “can I take this over and run it myself,” and ease of handover and low founder-dependency matter more than price. Among the listed cases, every deal that closed quickly had a business structure that was simple and easy to explain.
Going through a broker sits in between. The broker finds buyers on the seller’s behalf, prepares materials, and runs the negotiation. It costs a fee, but it’s a realistic option for someone selling while still running their main job.
Variables That Matter More Than Where You List
Choosing a route matters, but lining up the listed cases shows that price is driven less by the route itself than by the following three factors.
The direction of the growth trend. An upward trend commands a higher multiple. A downward trend doesn’t make a sale impossible, but in that case the approach is to disclose the problems upfront and protect the price through trust.
Whether the business depends on the founder. A business that stops running the moment the founder leaves loses value the instant a buyer acquires it. Conversely, the more it’s documented and automated, the higher the price.
The buyer’s “cost of building it themselves.” The acquisition price is decided by comparison against the time and money it would take the buyer to build the same thing from scratch. Growing revenue, then, is only one way for a seller to sell for more. Another is to build up assets that are hard for a buyer to replicate (data, brand, search rankings, community).
The Asymmetry Between Japan and Overseas
What the tally makes clear is that prices tend to stay undisclosed in Japan. Cases via Batonz and TRANBI have their deal processes carefully recorded, yet the price is almost never made public. In the English-speaking world, by contrast, there’s a culture of sellers publishing the sale amount and multiple themselves.
This gap also affects how sellers prepare. In a market where a shared sense of going rates doesn’t exist, it’s easy to mistake the first amount offered for the market rate. The fact that the listed cases include multiple records of deals closing “at twice the initial offer” or prices doubling after “a year of groundwork before the sale” backs up the fact that the first offer is only the starting point of negotiation.
How Buyers Showed Up
Separate from the breakdown of routes, pulling the trigger events for each deal from the cases sorts into a handful of patterns.
Industry events and conferences. In a sales-SaaS case, negotiations began after a major player in the same industry saw a demo. Standing in a place where prospective buyers gather, with a working product, becomes the pitch itself.
Communities and paid online salons. In a case of a Japanese indie-developed SaaS, the developer joined a “paid salon where operators earning money in that market gather” and transferred the business to a company they met there. A membership fee of a few tens of thousands of yen turned out to be a cheaper cost of meeting a buyer than a broker’s commission.
Unsolicited proposals from buyers. Roll-up companies are always scouting for candidates and reach out after seeing public numbers (MRR, review counts, rankings). There are many cases where building in public became the entry point to negotiations.
Acquisition by a business partner. In an agency case, a client of several years became the buyer as-is. The quality of the work itself doubled as due diligence.
What all of these have in common is that the seller didn’t decide to sell and then go find a buyer, a point of contact with a prospective buyer had already formed in the course of running the business.
What to Do Before Deciding to Sell
Looking across the listed cases, the kinds of preparation that affected price were: documenting founder-dependent tasks, keeping monthly records of the numbers, diversifying revenue sources, and a stance of “disclosing problems upfront.” That last one is counterintuitive, but a buyer will always find problems during due diligence. A problem disclosed upfront becomes a condition that’s already priced in. A problem discovered later becomes distrust that breaks the price negotiation.
As a rough guide for how much time to prepare, among the listed cases the ones that started moving a year before the sale got the best terms. Rather than listing on the day you decide to sell, listing at the end of a year spent polishing the business. That’s what moves the multiple.
Basis of This Tally
Of the 168 exit cases listed on this site, this tally covers the 167 for which the deal route is known. Deals with a sale price of ¥1,000,000 or less are not treated as meeting the listing criteria. Route classification is based on each article’s cited sources.
Sources
This article summarizes and analyzes the public sources above. Please refer to the primary sources for details.
This column is the editorial desk's own reading of the cases published on Small Start (all public information, all sourced) and of other public information. It is not a recommendation of any particular business, investment or side venture.
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